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Nowadays many employers offer their employees the possibility of an insurance against
too large losses in income when retiring or becoming disabled. This paper models the
optimizationproblem of the employer when settingup such a so-called pensionfund. not
surprisingly,it turns out that the optimal solutiondepends on the premium the employees
arewillingtopayatmostfortheinsurance. Sincethisisprivateinformationforanemploy-
ee and hence not known to the employer, he needs to collect information regarding these
maximum premiums. It is shown that in most cases the employer is unable to perfectly
inform himselfon thesemaximum premiums. So, he cannot create the rightincentivesfor
his employees to reveal their maximum premiums truthfully.
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Netherlands.1 Introduction
Because of the growing population of elder people, social systems in many western European
countries experience difﬁculties in guaranteeing an adequate income after retirement or dis-
ability. Especially those people with a higher income would experience a considerable loss
of income when retiring or becoming disabled. Insurance companies anticipated this situation




present income in case of disability, or an additional income above the pension supplied by the
social system after retirement.
Employers on the other hand have to pay social premiums on the salaries paid to their
employees. In the past decade, these premiums have gradually increased, and consequently,
employers continuously look for other means to compensate their employees so as to pay less
social premiums. A solution popular to many employersis creating a so-called ‘pension fund’
which, as the insurance companies do, insures employees against an excessive loss of income.
The difference, however, is the fact that this fund is not an insurance company, but completely
belongsto theemployer’sﬁrm,who beneﬁtsfromthisconstruction dueto adecreasing amount
of social premiums that have to be paid.
In this paper we analyze the employer’s decision problem with respect to the format of
such a pension fund. To cover the future claims of the participating employees the employer
establishes a pension fund. In our model we assume that any differences between the total
sum of realized claims and the pension fund’s total capital do not contribute to the employer’s
proﬁt/loss. So, if the total of realized claims turns out to be lower than the pension fund’s
capital, thentheproﬁtsoftheemployerdonot increase. Similarly,if thetotalof realizedclaims
turn out to be higher then the proﬁts of the employer do not decrease. This means that the
employer only beneﬁts from the pension fund through a decrease in the social premiums that
have to be paid. The pension fund, however, must be such that the probability that the total
claims exceed the available capital is sufﬁciently low. So, roughly speaking, the employer’s
objective is to maximize the reduction in social premiums that have to be paid, subject to the
earlier mentioned solvability constraint.
This paper focuses attention on the determination of the optimal insurance premium.
This premium is the same for all insured employees. So, the employer is not allowed to
discriminate between his employees. Reason for this assumption is that in some countrie,
2The Netherlands for example, price discrimination in this regard is illegal. For determining
this insurance premium the employer lacks some vital information, namely, how much the
employeeswant to pay at most for thisinsurance. In order to get this informationtheemployer
could simply ask each of his employees to tell him what insurance premium he wants to pay at
maximum. Then, given this information, he could determine the optimal insurance premium.
Actinginthiswaytheemployerimplicitlyassumes thathisemployeesarehonest andtruthfully
reveal their maximum premiums. The possibility of any strategic behavior bythe employeesis
undeservingly ignored. The employees, however, could induce a lower insurance premium by
not reporting the true maximum premium but another, lower one. Consequently, the employer
would charge a lower premium than he would have charged in the optimum, resulting in less
than optimal proﬁts.
Summarizing,it is not as much the determinationof the optimal insurance premium that
poses any problems to the employer, but the acquisition of the correct information. To answer
the questionwhether it is indeed possible for the employerto get the correct informationor not
we turn to implementation theory.
For surveys on implementation theory the reader is referred to Moore (1992) and Palfrey
(1992). Now, let us try to explain what implementation theory is all about. Consider the
employer and his employees and suppose that
￿
i is the true maximum premium of employee








￿. Instead, he can design a mechanism (or game) in which the employees
participate, that yields him some information regarding these maximum premiums
￿
i the
employees are willing to pay. Based on this (possibly biased) information he can solve his
optimization problem resulting in a premium
^
￿
￿. The problem is called implementable if
the employer can design a game such that the outcome
^
￿
￿ of this game coincides with the
optimal outcome
￿
￿. The interpretation is that the employer gets perfectly informed on the
maximum premiums when applying this speciﬁc game, since the outcome
^
￿
￿ of this game
coincides with the outcome
￿
￿ that the employer would have chosen if he knew the maximum
premiums beforehand. Summarizing, the employer’s decision problem is implementable if he
canconstructamechanism forwhichtheoutcomescoincidewiththeoutcomesthatareoptimal
from his point of view.
Unfortunately for the employer, it is shown that under rather weak conditions the em-
3ployer’s decision problem is not implementable. This means that there exists no mechanism,
how clever or complex it may be designed, that provides the employer with the informationhe
needs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 then
states the Bayesian implementation framework. Furthermore, it is shown that the employer’s
decision problem is not Bayesian implementable. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We start with explaining the model in the context of pension funds, that is, insurances that
guarantee employees of a sufﬁciently high income after retirement. Then we show that by
changingthemeaningofsomeof thevariables, thismodelalsoapplies fordisabilityinsurances














gbe the set of employees and denote the employer by
E.T h e





E, respectively. Next, let
t
=
1denote the starting year of the pension





i the remaining lifetime of employee
i;
P
i the year in which employee
i plans to retire;
w
i




















t the additional pension payments in year
t for which employee
i can take an insurance.
It is assumed that both death and retirement occur at the end of a year. Furthermore, we
introduce








g the social security premiums that have to be paid by the employer, expressed as a









4Note that the remaininglifetime
N
i of employee







1. Also note that wages and pension payments may vary over the years.
Furthermore, let
T be the year for which all employees have deceased with probability one.






T. Next, we assume




Moreover, since it is illegal - at least in The Netherlands - for the employer to discriminate
between hisemployees with respect to the insurancepremium,each employeethat participates
in the pension fund pays the same percentage of his wage as insurance premium. Insurance
companiesoperatingonthemarket,however,areallowedtodiscriminatebetweenthepremiums
that individuals have to pay for an insurance.
Now suppose that the employer organizes a pension fund for his employees and that the







) of the wage. Then employee
i
2
N has three different
actions at his disposal.





















i is retired in year
t, and zero if
employee
i is no longer alive in year
t. Thus, employee

























































i can decide to insure his income after retirement at an existing


























i pays in year




of his wage and that it may depend on




















t equals the payment that is provided by the insurance
and that it may vary over the years. Finally, his payoff equals zero if employee
i is no longer
alive in year
t. So, employee






























































The third and ﬁnal possibility for employee
i is to participate in the employer’s pension
















i is working in year
t. Note






i pays in year
t may be deducted from his gross wage, which
















has already retired in year
t, and his payoff equals zero if employee
i is no longer alive in year
t. So, in this case employee






























































expected utility. Moreover, taking the premiums charged by the existing insurance companies
as given, employee
i can determine the maximum premium
￿ he is willing to pay at most
for participation in the pension fund. Let
￿
i denote employee
i’s maximum premium. Then













Given these maximum premiums
￿
i we can consider the employer’s decision problem.
First, of course, the employer has to decide whether or not he starts a pension fund for his
employees. If he decides to do so, then he has to determine the premium that the employees
have to pay for participating in the pension fund. Furthermore, he has to decide how much







R. An incentive for the employer to contribute to the pension fund is the
following. The contributions
c
t enable the employer to lower the premium, possibly resulting
in more employees participating in the pension fund, which yields that less social premiums
have to be paid. Hence, the beneﬁts of the employer may increase.
Suppose the employer does not organize a pension fund for his employees. In that case





























t, that is, the wages he has to pay to his
employees plus the social premiums.
Next, suppose that hedoesorganizeapension fund. Then, given apremium
￿, employee




i, that is, if the premium is less than or equal to
the maximum premium he is willing to pay for the insurance. So in case of indifference



































































































t if he does not. Note that the
premium may be deducted from the employee’s gross wage, resulting in a decrease in social
6premiums that have to be paid. With respect to a retired employee







i participates in the pension fund, and it equals zero if he
does not. Furthermore, the employer contributes in year
t an amount
c
t to the pension fund’s

































































































There are, however, solvability constraints on the pension fund’s capital that have to
be satisﬁed. For each year
t the probability that the total amount of money claimed thus far











































































Note that both the claims and the available capital are random variables. The solvability



















































































































)such that his expected
utility is maximal given that the solvability restrictions of (5) are satisﬁed. So, the employer’s



























































































































































































































7Note that if the resulting expected utility is less than the utility level corresponding to
organizing no pension fond, then the employer does, of course, not establish a pension fund
for his employees.
Next, let us take a closer look at the employer’s decision problem. To start with the
solvability constraints, note that probability distribution functions are continuous from the
right. So, given a premium







































































































































































































































































































































Next, we show that in the optimum the premium
￿ can be chosen equal to the maximum
premium
￿
i of some employee
i. For this purpose, let























) be the number of insured employees if the
premium equals




m iswillingtopayat most fortheinsurance.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since the payoff corresponding to a premium



















n. So, instead of deciding what premium to charge he can decide on how many
employees he wants to insure. If he wants to insure exactly












1 then it is not possible for the employer to insure exactly















































Notethat we havealso included
m
=
0 , so that organizingno pension fundis also incorporated
as a possibility. Exchanging the decision variable
￿ for

















































































































Remark that the employer’s constrained optimization problem has now been reduced to an
unconstrained optimization problem over a ﬁnite number of possibilities.
The problem considered thus far is concerned with the insurance of an (additional)





9also describes the insurance of an (additional) income when an employer becomes disabled.
For this, deﬁne for each employee
i
N
i the year in whichthe insurance paymentsto employee
iend. This, for example, happens
when employee
i dies or when he reaches the retirement age, in which case he receives
a pension from the government.;
P
























t the additional income in year
t for which employee
i can take an insurance;


























i. Note that these are the
same time periods that occur in the model on pensions. Thus the problem formulated in (8)




i of theemployees. Giventhese maximum premiumshe can determinethe optimal
solution
m
￿ of (8), and subsequently he can offer his employees to participate in the pension
fund for a premium
￿
m
￿. In reality, however, it is unlikely that an employer is completely
informed on the maximum premiums
￿
i his employees are willing to pay for an insurance.
Indeed, this maximum premium is private information for the employee and not known to his
colleagues or his employer.
Since the employer has incomplete knowledge of the maximum premiums
￿
i of his
employees, he is not able to solve the optimization problem formulated in (8). To get infor-
mation on these maximum premiums, the employer could approach each of his employeesand
ask them to reveal their maximum premiums. Subseqeuntly, he could determine the optimal
solution as described above and announce the premium to his employees. Obtaining informa-
tion in this way, however, has the drawback that employees have incentives to misreport their
maximum premiums. More precisely, employees have a tendency to reveal lower maximum
premiums than the true ones. As a result, the inaccurate information used by the employer
results in a premium that is not optimal for him. Arises the question whether there is some
10other way for the employer to obtain the information he needs. This question is dealt with in
the next section.
3 The Implementation Problem
Acquiring the correct information in order to determine the optimal premium from the em-
ployer’s point of view is known in the literature as an implementation problem. To be more
speciﬁc, since employees only have information on their own maximum premium
￿
i and not
on the maximum premiums of the other employees, it is a Bayesian implementation problem.
Before we take a more general approach to Bayesian implementation let us elaborate on the
situation described at the end of the previous section: the situation where each employee was





















i’s maximum premium implies that he also does not know his utility function.
Furthermore, employee
i only knows his own utility function and not the utility functions of
















)denote the vector of utility functions. Such
a vector
u is called the state of the world. Recall that the employer has no knowledge about
the state
u of utility functions and that employee
i only has partial knowledge of the state
u,
namely, his own utility function
u
i. Furthermore, since employees were assumed to be risk
















iis strictly increasing and concave
g
;















To get some information on the true state of the world the employer asks his employees















































)each employeeis willingto pay fortheinsurance. Subsequently,he uses thesemaximum


























). Then the employer




















)exceeds the reported maximum premium.
Moreover, the employees know beforehand that this rule applies. So, they can take this into
account when deciding which utility function to reveal. At ﬁrst sight this rule might seem a
bit restrictivecomparedto the morerealistic case wherethe employees may decide themselves






















































































































































































































depending on which of the two outside options employee
i prefers most, that is, no insurance








) denote the payoff to employee
i when
^



























































) is evaluated by his true utility function
u












Which utility function he reports depends on the strategy he plays.
As t r a t e g y
￿
i for employee
i indicates which utility function is reported given the true
utilityfunction. Formally,thismeans that
￿
















utility function then he reports the utility function
^
u
i. For example, the strategy that always































)of all employees and thetrue state of theworld


























































). Determining this expected
utility, however, is impossible considering the fact that employee
i does not completely know
the state
u. In fact, he only knows his own utility function
u
i. To circumvent this problem,
each employee
i has beliefs about the true state






















i. The expected utility of employee









































i to a strategy
^
￿
i if the expected utility of
￿



















































































































































































































￿ is calledincentivecompatibleif reportingthetrueutilityfunction










































































































￿ is incentive compatible then revealing the true utility functions is a
Bayesianequilibrium. Thismeansfromanequilibriumpointofviewthattheemployerbecomes
correctly informed on the true utility functions and, consequently, that he charges the optimal
13insurance premium that yields him maximal beneﬁts. The next theorem, however, shows that
under some conditions the payoff function
h
￿ does not satisfy incentive compatibility. Hence,
the employer can not expect to get perfect information on the true utility functions.



























































B be a Borel set in
￿
￿
































as the set of all utilityfunctions
u
￿
i of the other employees such that the corresponding vector
of maximum premiums belongs to
B.
Theorem 3.1 Let


















































￿ is not incentive compatible.
PROOF: See Appendix A.
The condition is satisﬁed for sure if there exists an employee
i and a utility function
u






) is strictly positive.
Since the payoff function
h
￿ is not incentive compatible, the employer cannot get the
information he needs by just asking his employees. This is, however, only one way to get
information. The employer could, of course, design other methods to receive information on
the maximum premiums of his employees. These other methods are described by so-called
mechanisms.





















i the action space
of employee
i and
￿ the payoff function, assigning to each action
a
2
A a (stochastic) payoff
to each employee. For example, in the previously described mechanism where each employee
reports his utility function, an action for employee










































). A strategy for employee




















i is his true utility function.
Given the strategies














































i (weakly) prefers the strategy
￿
i to the strategy
^
￿
i if the expected
utility of
￿
i is greater than or equal to the expected utility of
^
￿















































































￿ is then called a Bayesian equilibrium if for each employee
i and








i of the remaining employees. Mathematically,





































































































since this corresponds to maximal beneﬁts for the employer. To be sure that his beneﬁts are
maximal for each possible state





) in such a
way that every Bayesian equilibrium

















If he can indeed construct such a mechanism then the payoff function
h
￿ is called Bayesian
implementable.
Similar to Bayesian implementation with a ﬁnite number of states of the world (see
Jackson (1991)) one can easily show that incentive compatibility as formulated in (10) is a
necessary condition or
h
￿ to be Bayesian implementable. To see this, suppose that
h
￿ is
Bayesian implementable but not incentive compatible. Then some employee







) by pretending that some
^
u
i is his true utilityfunction instead
of his true utility function
u
i. But since each Bayesian equilibrium













































). Obviously, this contradicts the fact that
￿ is a Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, the
payoff function
h
￿ must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Theorem 3.1 showed that under rather weak conditions, the payoff function
h
￿ does
not satisfy the incentive compatibility property. This implies that
h
￿ is also not Bayesian
implementable. Thus there exists no mechanism, how complex or clever it may be designed,
thatgivestheemployerthecorrectinformationregardingtheutilityfunctionsofhisemployees.
4 Remarks
Theorem 3.1 tells us that under some conditions the employer is not able to perfectly inform
himself on the maximum premiums of his employees. Recall that the payoff function desired
by the employer was chosen in such a way that employees can only participate in the pension
fund if the maximum premium they report does not exceed the premium set by the employer.
So, in fact, the employer decided whether an employee got the insurance or not. As already
mentioned, a natural (and maybe more realistic) adjustment of this payoff function is to let the
employeesdecidewhethertheywanttoparticipateornot. So,giventheinformationrevealedby
theemployees,theemployersetsaninsurancepremiumandeachemployeedecidesindividually
if he participates or not. This payoff function, however, does also not satisfy the incentive
compatibility property. This can easily beseen as follows. Suppose that it did satisfy incentive
compatibility. Then revealing the true utility function would be a Bayesian equilibrium. But
if each employee reveals his true utility function then it does not matter whether the employer
decides on the participation of an employee in the pension fund, or the employee himself
decides this. So if the adjusted payoff function satisﬁes incentive compatibility, then so does
the original payoff function. Since the latter is not true, the adjusted payoff function can not
be incentive compatible.





i contains any strictly increasing and concave utility function. This
guarantees that for any ‘reasonable’ insurance premium there exists a utility function such
16that the corresponding maximum premium equals the aforementioned insurance premium.
In this context, reasonable means that the premium should be at least the expected loss of
income. This is due to the risk averse behavior of the employees. Furthermore, the premium
should not exceed the maximum amount that theoretically can be received from the insurance.
Taking this notion of reasonability into account, it is not difﬁcult to see that Theorem 3.1 still
holds if the set of utility functions
U
i is restricted in such a way, that for every ‘reasonable’
insurance premium there still exists a utility function in
U
i for which the corresponding





























g. An incidental beneﬁt in this case is that the beliefs
of employee




i, i.e., the parameters that determine the utility functions of
the other employees. Furthermore, the condition formulated in Theorem 3.1 holds for any
continuous probability distribution on
a
￿
i with strictly positive density function.
The overall consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that there is no need for the employer to
organizea(complex) mechanism to acquireinformationwhen settingup apension fundfor his
employees,sincealltheinformationrevealedbytheemployeescannotberatedatitstruevalue.
The alternatives left for the employer are either to get the information elsewhere (if possible)
or to set an insurance premium independent of the information revealed by the employees. for
the actual height of the premium the employer could use the market premium as an indication.





) includes many ways of collecting
information on the maximum premiums of the employees. For example, by introducing
individual taxes the employer can discriminate between individual employees. Although such
a mechanism is illegal in our model, the main result does not change if it would be allowed.
So, even if the employer is allowed to discriminate between his employees, he can not get
perfectly informed on the maximum premiums.
175 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1
The outline of the proof is as follows. To show our main result we only consider deviations
by employees to utility functions yielding a lower maximum premium. This turns out to be
sufﬁcient to show that
h
￿ is not incentive compatible. The proof consists of ﬁve parts. In the
ﬁrst part of the proof we examine how the premium changes when an employee deviates from
revealing his true utility function. The second part focuses on the cases for which deviating
decreases theexpectedutilityof anemployee,whilethethirdpartconsidersthecasesforwhich
deviating increases his expected utility. In the fourth part of the proof we deduce a necessary
condition on
h
￿ to satisfy incentive compatibility. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal part then shows that this
necessary condition cannot be satisﬁed.
Throughout this proof let the true utility function
u
i of employee















premium set by the employer when utility functions
^
u are revealed. Finally, we make the













































g is a set with Lebesgue



































































So,in every stateoftheworldno twoemployeescan havethesame maximumpremium. Third,
weassumethatifanemployeedeviatesthenhereportsautilityfunctionwithalowermaximum
premium than the one corresponding to his true utility function.
Let us start with examining how the premium
￿





instead of his true utility function
u




























m-highest maximum premium when
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). The employer’s optimization problem


























































































































































































































To see how the premium
￿
￿ changes when employee


























































) . These cases are graphically presented in Figure 1 on page 27
. In each graph the height of a bar represents the maximum premium that is reported by an
employee. Note that the employees are placed in decreasing order with respect to the reported
maximum premium.

















) . So, employee
i does not get an
insurance from the employer. Now, suppose that employee


























) then his expected








































j as depicted in Case 1 of Figure 1, then the optimal
























) . Indeed, the only case























































k as depicted in Case 1 of Figure 1, then the
optimal solution can change. In this case the value of the objective function changes when















































































































































































































) cannot be optimal. A similar argument holds if






























































) it follows that employee
































































































i is not allowed to partcipate in the pension fund when he reveals his true
utility function
u
i, then he also is not allowed to participate when he reports a utility function
^
u






























) , we have that employee
i gets the
insurance from his employer. Again, suppose that employee




































j as depicted in Case 2 of Figure 1, then the optimum















































k as depicted in Case 2 of Figure 1, then the












































































),w h i c h













































































































































































). This means that employee
i still participates in the


































) . Suppose employee
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Summarizing Case 3, if the premium
￿
￿ increases due to the fact employee
i reports






), then this implies that employee



























Now let us start with the second part of the proof. If the expected utility of employee
i





i then one of the following two possibility applies:
either he gets the insurance for a higher premium, or he gets the insurance when reporting
u
i




Let us begin with the ﬁrst possibility, that is, he can still participate in the pension fund





























































i gets the insurance when reporting
u
i the cases 2
















































). This implies that employee
i cannot partcipate in the pension fund. Hence, the
case that employee
i participates for a higher premium when deviating cannot occur.
The only possibility left for which the expected utility of employee
i decreases is, if he
gets the insurance when reporting
u








































). Recall that when employee
i is not allowed
to participate in the pension fund if he reports
^
u
























































































































depending on which of the two outside options employee



























) equals the expected utility of employee
i when he participates in the









































































































































) this also implies that employee
i is indifferent between participating in the pension

























































































i strictly decreases the expected utility.






























For the thirdof the proof let us focus on the case that the expected utilityincreases. This
is the case when either employee
i participates in the pension fund for a lower premium, or
employee
i participates when reporting
^
u
i whereas he cannot participate when reporting
u
i.









































































































can also not participate in the pension fund when he reports
^
u
i. Thus, the case that employee
i
does not participate in the pension fund when reporting
u




The remaining possibility is the one where employee






























































fact, to show that
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Then the expected utility of employee













































































compatibility, then for the true utility function
u




















































































































). So, if deviating to
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FIGURE 1: The relation between the reported premium and the optimal premium.
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